The Playboy and the Priest

[bcholmes]

Many Haitians and outside observers of all political stripes justly worry that the resurgence to public notice of Haiti’s two most polarizing political figures comes at a dangerous moment. The presence of Duvalier and Aristide in Haiti would raise the stakes in a desperate political situation, and the lives of many Haitians could hang in the balance. Neither man, in and of himself, offers the solution to Haiti’s crises. But repeatedly subordinating justice and the law in favour of what is supposedly “best” for Haitians is a hallmark of Duvalierist elitism, and plays right into Duvalier’s hands.

Similar predictions of imminent civil war in, for example, early 1990s South Africa during apartheid’s collapse proved unfounded, in part because that transition happened in a public fashion, and efforts were made to ensure that the post-apartheid South African state truly had the capacity to govern the country. In Haiti, no less than South Africa, democracy and transparency should not be compromised due to fear of a conflict that does not have to happen.

The real issue is that neither Duvalier not Aristide should ever have left Haiti in the first place. Not even his staunchest opponents can give a sound legal reason why Aristide is barred from returning. The U.S. State Department, the agency ultimately responsible for removing both Duvalier and Aristide from Haiti, says only that Aristide’s return is the “last thing” the country needs.

No credible evidence exists that his régime came anywhere close to the brutality and corruption of Duvalier. Clearly, the reasons for Aristide’s exile from his own country are political, and, by moral or international standards, completely illegal and undemocratic.

In 1986, the U.S. ignored calls for a fair judicial process in Haiti against the Duvaliers, claiming that it was best for stability if they fled. The U.S. and France spirited him out of the country and protected him from having to face the justified wrath of his people. Conveniently, this meant that no damaging secrets that might implicate the U.S. government would come out at his trial.

Allowing the Duvaliers to defend themselves publicly would have revealed that, since the Nixon administration, the Duvalier government was almost entirely bankrolled by U.S. dollars. This support paid for the policies that cost many their lives and forced hundreds of thousands of Haitians into exile.

President Aristide, a leader with a real democratic support base, posed a different problem. Starting with the Clinton administration, the policy was to appear to work with him while undermining his democratic credibility. This began in 1994, when the Clinton administration restored him to power (after the first Bush government backed a 1991 military coup that forced him from office). Clinton brought Aristide back via a highly public and wholly unnecessary ‘U.N’ mission that Haitians knew was a cover for U.S. occupation. This decision was intended to, at best, confuse Haitians about Aristide’s intentions, and, at worst, alienate him from his supporters. At the same time, the Clinton administration made Aristide sign an IMF structural adjustment plan that left him more or less unable to carry out the reforms for which he had been elected.

Sadly for the forces of Western dominance, even this was not enough – Aristide remained popular, and in 2000 he was returned to office with a large majority in elections that foreign observers said were fair, but which the U.S. government denounced anyway. At this point, the Americans inaugurated one of the most creative policies of modern economic imperialism. In contrast to the generous financing of the Duvalier régime, the U.S. began transforming Haiti into “the republic of NGOs,” depriving the government, dependent since the era of Jean-Claude on foreign aid and loans, of the funds needed in order to run the country.

[...]

Prioritizing ‘security’ and supposed ‘stability’ over democracy and the rule of law will not make life better for Haitians. Ultimately, Haitians should decide the futures of Duvalier and Aristide, as they tried to do in 1986 and 2004. Haitians’ fears about what could happen if the playboy and the priest both return to Haiti should be taken seriously. If conflict does result, then the responsibility lies squarely with the U.S, France, Canada, and the U.N mission. For these manipulative interest groups, the worry is ultimately that an order designed in the interests of foreign governments, foreign agencies and a tiny minority in the Haitian elite, will be upset by a public reckoning with injustice.

— Melanie Newton, "The Playboy and the Priest: Duvalier, Aristide and Haitian Democracy", emphasis added

Excellent, excellent article.